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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendant-appellant Cleveland Swint (Swint) pleaded 
guilty to one count of knowingly using and trafficking in 
unauthorized access devices to obtain things of value 
aggregating more than $1,000 during a one-year period, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1029(a)(2) & 2. He entered into a 
written plea agreement with the government, pursuant to 
which he agreed to fully cooperate with the government in, 
inter alia, its investigations. The government agreed not to 
prosecute him for other criminal activity committed during 
the time of his charged offenses and to move for a 
downward departure in his sentence in exchange for 
Swint's "substantial assistance" with one or more 
government investigations and not committing any 
additional crimes. The agreement provided that "[t]he 
determination whether Swint has provided substantial 
assistance to the Government rests solely in the discretion 
of " the United States Attorney's Office. After entering into 
the agreement but before sentencing, Swint committed two 
more offenses. The government informed Swint that he had 
violated the plea agreement and that it would not seek the 
downward departure. At sentencing, the district court 
sentenced Swint to a term of seventy months' 
imprisonment. Swint appeals his sentence, arguing that the 
government breached the plea agreement. We affirm. 
 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
In August, 1997, police officers in Edison, New Jersey, 
along with U.S. Secret Service Agents, began an 
investigation into the suspected unlawful use of innocent 
individuals' names and social security numbers to obtain 
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bank loans, checks, credit cards, and an auto lease. The 
investigation revealed Swint as the perpetrator of these 
activities. Investigators ultimately learned that during a 
one-year period, Swint had engaged in at least twenty-six 
fraudulent transactions, resulting in total losses (actual 
and intended) of $264,833.56. On October 20, 1997, Swint 
was arrested and charged by information with one count of 
violating 18 U.S.C. SS 1029(a)(2)1  & 2.2 
 
Soon after his arrest, Swint began negotiations with the 
government regarding a plea agreement. Pursuant to the 
agreement, the government agreed not to prosecute Swint 
for other charges arising from his fraudulent activities 
between May, 1997 and October, 1997. In return, Swint 
agreed to "cooperate fully" with the U.S. Attorney's 
investigation, including providing truthfully all information 
requested of him; testifying on behalf of the government; 
and, if requested, making himself available for assisting one 
or more government investigations, including making phone 
calls, tape recording conversations, and introducing law 
enforcement officials to other individuals, provided "[a]ll 
such activity by Swint must be conducted only at the 
express direction and under the supervision of . . .[the 
United States Attorney's Office] and federal law enforcement 
personnel." The agreement provides that the 
nonprosecution provisions will be ineffective if Swint 
commits any new federal, state or local crimes" or otherwise 
has violated any provision of this agreement." It states that 
if Swint fully complied with the agreement and provided 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. S 1029(a)(2) proscribes 
 
       "knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or 
more 
       unauthorized access devices during any one-year period, and by 
       such conduct obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more 
       during that period." 
 
2. 18 U.S.C. S 2 provides: 
 
       (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, 
       abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
       punishable as a principal. 
 
       (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
       performed by him or another would be an offense against the United 
       States, is punishable as a principal." 
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"substantial assistance" in the investigation or prosecution 
of one or more persons who had committed criminal 
offenses, the government would move for a downward 
departure for his sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G.S 5K1.1.3 
On November 20, 1998, the district court accepted Swint's 
guilty plea. The government supported Swint's bail 
application, and Swint was eventually released on bond. 
 
After he was released on bail, Swint began cooperating 
with the U.S. Attorney's office in its investigation of various 
credit card and other fraudulent scams. On February 18, 
1999, while on bail, Swint used another person's name and 
social security number to lease a 1999 Ford Expedition 
sports utility vehicle, valued at approximately $40,000. He 
was arrested by the police department of Hillside, New 
Jersey. On May 10, 1999, the Assistant U.S. Attorney who 
had negotiated the plea agreement with Swint met with him 
and his lawyer and informed them that Swint's February 18 
arrest could seriously jeopardize his chances of obtaining 
the section 5K1.1 downward departure. The AUSA warned 
Swint that if he were involved in any further violations of 
federal, state, or local law, the government would not seek 
the departure. 
 
Deterred only briefly, Swint soon broke the law again. 
Barely a month later, on June 14, 1999, he used a false 
name to complete a credit card application at a Home 
Depot store. He was arrested by the police department of 
South Plainfield, New Jersey, and charged with attempted 
credit card fraud, resisting arrest, and obstruction.4 On 
June 15, 1999, the government informed Swint by letter 
that because he had violated the plea agreement twice by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 provides in relevant part: 
 
       "Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has 
       provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution 
       of another person who has committed an offense, the court may 
       depart from the guidelines." 
 
4. Following Swint's arrest on June 14, 1999, the U.S. Customs Service 
determined that Swint had engaged in additional criminal activity, 
including using a false identity to lease a vehicle from a Chevrolet 
dealership, as well as unlawfully re-titling, placing in another's name, 
and switching license plates on the vehicle. 
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engaging in two separate incidents of criminal conduct, the 
government would not move for the section 5K1.1 
departure. 
 
The district court conducted a sentencing hearing on 
July 15, 1999. At the hearing, Swint moved for a three-level 
downward departure pursuant to section 3E1.1 based on 
his acceptance of responsibility. Swint also argued that the 
district court should not depart upward based on his 
"egregious" criminal record because he cooperated 
extensively with the government's investigations. In 
addition, he argued that the district court should compel 
the government to file a motion to depart downward 
pursuant to section 5K1.1. The government acknowledged 
that Swint had provided "substantial" assistance in one 
case, but that he was not entitled to the downward 
departure because he had breached the plea agreement by 
committing the two subsequent offenses in February and 
June, 1999. 
 
The district court denied Swint's motion for a downward 
departure for acceptance of responsibility because Swint 
had committed additional offenses after entering into the 
plea agreement. The court also agreed with the 
government's decision not to seek a downward departure 
under section 5K1.1 because Swint had breached the plea 
agreement in three ways: (1) by committing additional 
crimes after signing the plea agreement; (2) by failing to 
disclose to the government his ongoing criminal activities; 
and (3) by acting in a manner, while cooperating with the 
government, that was not at the express direction of the 
government. 
 
The district court then examined Swint's criminal history 
score, which the PSR calculated at VI. Describing Swint's 
thirty-year criminal history as "prodigious" and a "Niagara" 
and considering the fact that Swint had twenty-two 
convictions that had not been counted toward his criminal 
history score, the district court departed upward from the 
applicable range of forty-six to fifty-seven months to sixty- 
three to seventy-eight months. At that point, the 
government detailed the extent of Swint's cooperation with 
the government's investigation, and requested the court to 
sentence Swint in the lower half of the new range. The 
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court did so and sentenced Swint to seventy months' 




Swint makes two primary arguments on appeal. First, he 
contends that despite his committing two criminal acts 
after entering into the plea agreement, the government 
breached the agreement by not moving for a downward 
departure under section 5K1.1. Second, Swint maintains 
that the government also breached the agreement by failing 
to inform the district court of the "full nature and extent" 
of his cooperation with the investigation until it was too late 
in the sentencing hearing. Finding both arguments to be 
without merit, we affirm Swint's sentence. 
 
I. Construction of the Plea Agreement 
 
The first issue is essentially one of contract construction. 
Swint argues that the government breached the plea 
agreement by not requesting a downward departure for him 
based on his substantial assistance. He asserts that despite 
the two offenses he committed after entering into the plea 
agreement, the language of the agreement still required the 
government to move for the downward departure at 
sentencing. Whether the government breached the plea 
agreement is a question of law which this Court reviews de 
novo. See United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 184, 187 (3d 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 142 (3d 
Cir. 1997). When a defendant has entered into a plea 
agreement expressly requiring the government to move for 
a downward departure under section 5K1.1, the district 
court and reviewing court are "free to apply contract 
principles" to determine whether the parties have complied 
with the terms of the agreement. See United States v. Isaac, 
141 F.3d 477, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1998).5 Swint has the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In situations in which there is no plea agreement, the government's 
decision not to move for a downward departure based on section 5K1.1 
may be reviewed only for "unconstitutional motive," like race or religion. 
See Isaac, 141 F.3d at 481 (citing Wade v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1840 
(1992)). When there is an agreement, the district court may interpret the 
agreement according to contract principles and consider whether the 
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burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the government breached the plea agreement. 
See Huang, 178 F.3d at 187. 
 
The relevant portions of the plea agreement provide as 
follows: 
 
       ". . . If Swint enters a guilty plea and is sentenced on 
       this charge, and otherwise fully complies with all of the 
       terms of this agreement, this Office will not initiate any 
       further charges arising from Swint's participation 
       between May 1997 and October 1997 in the 
       unauthorized use of unauthorized access devices. . .. 
 
       Cooperation 
 
       Swint shall cooperate fully with this office. As part of 
       that obligation, Swint shall truthfully disclose all 
       information concerning all matters about which this 
       office and other Government agencies designated by 
       this Office may inquire of him. Swint also shall make 
       himself available at all reasonable times requested by 
       representatives of the Government and shall truthfully 
       testify in all proceedings, including grand jury and trial 
       proceedings, as to any subject about which he is 
       questioned. Furthermore, Swint agrees to provide to 
       this Office, upon request, all documents and other 
       materials relating to matters about which this Office 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
government has acted in good faith in choosing not to move for the 
downward departure. See id. at 481-83. Presumably, a district court may 
also determine whether the government has acted with an 
unconstitutional motive in this circumstance. Huang suggests that even 
when a plea agreement exists, the government's decision not to move for 
a section 5K1.1 departure may be reviewed only  for unconstitutional 
motive or bad faith, see Huang, 178 F.3d at 189, but this conclusion 
may simply represent a drafting slip. District courts, as well as 
reviewing 
courts, clearly retain the ability to employ contract principles to 
determine whether both parties have complied with the terms of a plea 
agreement. This point is ultimately irrelevant to the present appeal 
because Swint has alleged neither bad faith nor unconstitutional motive 
on the part of the government, and it appears that the government acted 
within the terms of the agreement in not seeking the departure, see 
infra. 
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       inquires of him. Full cooperation includes participating, 
       if requested, in affirmative investigative techniques, 
       such as making telephone calls, tape recording 
       conversations, and introducing law enforcement 
       officials to other individuals. All such activity by Swint 
       must be conducted only at the express direction and 
       under the supervision of this Office and federal law 
       enforcement personnel. 
 
       Should Swint withdraw from this agreement, or 
       should Swint commit any additional federal, state, or 
       local crimes, or should it be established that Swint has 
       intentionally given materially false, incomplete, or 
       misleading testimony or information or otherwise has 
       violated any provision of this agreement, the non- 
       prosecution provisions of this agreement shall be null 
       and void. All other provisions of this agreement shall 
       remain in full force and effect . . . . 
 
       Sentencing 
 
       . . . 
 
       Except as otherwise provided in this agreement, this 
       office reserves its right to take any position with 
       respect to the appropriate sentence to be imposed on 
       Swint by the sentencing judge. In addition, this Office 
       will inform the sentencing judge and the U.S. Probation 
       Office of: (1) this agreement; (2) the nature and extent 
       of Swint's activities and relevant conduct with respect 
       to this case; (3) the full nature and extent of Swint's 
       cooperation with this Office and when such cooperation 
       commenced; and (4) all other information relevant to 
       sentencing, favorable or otherwise, including 
       information provided by Swint before and after signing 
       this agreement. 
 
       Further, if Swint fully complies with this agreement 
       and, prior to his sentencing, provides substantial 
       assistance in the investigation or prosecution of one or 
       more persons who have committed offenses, this office 
       will move the sentencing judge, pursuant to Section 
       5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, to depart from the 
       otherwise applicable guideline range. Whether the 
       sentencing judge does in fact impose a sentence below 
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       the otherwise applicable guideline range is a matter 
       committed solely to the discretion of the sentencing 
       judge. The determination whether Swint has provided 
       substantial assistance to the Government rests solely in 
       the discretion of this Office. Swint may not withdraw 
       his plea if this Office determines that Swint has not 
       rendered substantial assistance or if the court refuses 
       to grant the Government's motion for a downward 
       departure." (emphasis added) 
 
Swint concedes that the offenses he committed in 
February and June, 1999, constituted violations of the plea 
agreement.6 Swint's argument concerns instead the proper 
remedy for these violations. Relying primarily on the 
"Cooperation" section, which provides that"the non- 
prosecution provisions of this agreement shall be null and 
void" in the event that Swint withdraws from the agreement 
or violates it in any way, Swint argues that the only remedy 
available to the government is the rescission of its promise 
not to prosecute other offenses arising during the period of 
May-October, 1997.7 In support of his argument, Swint 
points to the next sentence of the "Cooperation" section, 
which states that "[a]ll other provisions of this agreement 
shall remain in full force and effect." Accordingly, he 
contends that the government's obligation to move for the 
downward departure based on his substantial cooperation 
likewise remains "in full force and effect." By not moving for 
a downward departure, the government (according to Swint) 
breached the plea agreement. 
 
Swint's reading of the plea agreement is flawed. As the 
government rightly points out, the "Sentencing" section of 
the agreement, which discusses the section 5K1.1 motion, 
specifically conditions the government's moving for the 
downward departure on (1) Swint's "fully" complying with 
the agreement "and" (2) his providing "substantial 
assistance" with the government's investigation. As Swint 
was fully aware, one of the basic requirements of the plea 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Indeed his counsel expressly so conceded at oral argument. 
 
7. There is no evidence, and Swint does not claim, that the government 
has attempted to prosecute Swint for any offenses that occurred between 
May and October, 1997. 
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agreement was that Swint commit no more crimes. After his 
first arrest on February 18, 1999, the government even 
gave Swint another chance and told him that if he engaged 
in further illegal activity, he would forfeit the departure 
motion. Shortly thereafter, on June 14, 1999, Swint again 
violated this provision of the agreement when he attempted 
to commit credit card fraud at the Home Depot store. By 
committing these subsequent offenses, Swint, as he admits, 
failed to comply with the terms of the agreement; under the 
"Sentencing" provision, Swint's noncompliance released the 
government from its obligation to move for the downward 
departure. Furthermore, we reject Swint's argument that 
his breach was not material. 
 
Under Swint's reading of the plea agreement, any  
violation of the agreement would result only in the voiding 
of the non-prosecution provision. Accordingly, no violation 
could extinguish the government's promise to move for the 
downward departure, a result we find absurd. The language 
that Swint relies on says that the non-prosecution 
provisions of the agreement will be null and void if Swint 
breaches the agreement and that the other provisions will 
remain in full effect. This is not tantamount to saying that 
all of the government's obligations will remain in full effect; 
instead, it states that the other provisions of the agreement, 
including the "Sentencing" provision and its requirement 
that Swint comply fully with the agreement in order to earn 
the downward departure motion, remain in effect. Swint's 
post hoc parsing of the plea agreement does not alter that 
fact. 
 
Moreover, the operative effect of Swint's interpretation 
would eviscerate one purpose of the plea agreement (as well 
as the purpose of allowing him out on bail), which was to 
have Swint aid the government in exchange for a possibly 
lower sentence--in other words, to make him earn the 
downward departure motion. The purpose was not to 
enable him to engage in further illegal activity, and then 
still benefit from the downward departure. "In determining 
whether the terms of the plea agreement have been 
violated, the court must determine whether the 
government's conduct is consistent with the parties' 
reasonable understanding of the agreement." Roman, 121 
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F.3d at 142 (quoting United States v. Hernandez , 17 F.3d 
78, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1994)). We find the government's 
decision not to move for a downward departure manifestly 
consistent with any reasonable understanding of this plea 
agreement. By contrast, Swint's construction of the 
agreement makes little sense in light of the agreement's 
clear purpose. This Court has rejected other tortured and 
illogical interpretations of plea agreements, and we do the 
same here. See Huang, 178 F.3d at 189 (rejecting "the 
remarkable proposition" argued by the defendant that when 
the government refuses to move for a downward departure 
because the defendant has not performed under the plea 
agreement, the defendant should be permitted to withdraw 
his guilty plea). 
 
Swint relies on the Second Circuit's recent opinion in 
United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999), but 
we find that case distinguishable. In Padilla , the 
government submitted a section 5K1.1 motion based on the 
defendant's substantial assistance, but the defendant failed 
to appear at the sentencing hearing. See Padilla , 186 F.3d 
at 139. The defendant was subsequently arrested for 
participating in the sale of two bags of crack cocaine to a 
police officer. See id. Prior to the second sentencing 
hearing, the government withdrew its section 5K1.1 motion 
on the ground that Padilla's offense violated the plea 
agreement. On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the 
government had breached the agreement because the 
government withdrew the motion, after originally making it, 
without an enumerated provision in the plea agreement 
permitting it to withdraw such a motion. See id.  at 141. The 
Padilla court observed "[t]he [plea] agreement, however, is 
silent with regard to the withdrawal of a Section 5K1.1 and 
18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) motion," id. at 141 (original emphasis), 
and went on to state "we conclude that it [the plea 
agreement] prohibits the Government from withdrawing the 
Section 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) motion because it 
failed to enumerate specifically the right to withdraw the 
motion in the several specific and serious consequences 
that would follow if Padilla committed further crimes or 
otherwise violated the agreement." Id. (emphasis added). 
See also id. at 142 ("The plea agreement was silent as to 
whether the Government could withdraw the Section 5K1.1 
 
                                11 
  
and 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) motion . . ."). The Second Circuit 
concluded this portion of its opinion by stating"[o]ur 
holding is necessarily a narrow one, because of the limited 
nature of the issue raised by the attempted withdrawal of 
the motion . . . Withdrawal has been specifically dealt with 
in some plea agreements but was not in the one before us." 
Id. at 142. Here, by contrast, withdrawal of a previously 
made motion is not at all involved, and the plea agreement 
between Swint and the government by the clearest 
implication contemplates that the government may elect not 
to move for the section 5K1.1 downward departure in the 
event of Swint's noncompliance. Padilla's"narrow" holding 
is consequently inapposite here.8 
 
II. The "Full Nature and Extent" of Swint's Cooperation 
 
Swint's other principal argument is that the government 
breached the plea agreement by failing to inform the district 
court at sentencing of the "full nature and extent" of his 
cooperation with the government's investigation. This 
argument is also meritless. 
 
The plea agreement provides that the government"will 
inform the sentencing judge and the U.S. Probation Office 
of . . . the full nature and extent of Swint's cooperation with 
this Office and when such cooperation commenced." Swint 
contends that the government breached this obligation in 
that its provision of the details of Swint's cooperation to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The government also suggests that by committing these two 
subsequent offenses, Swint did not meet the other basic requirement of 
providing "substantial assistance." The government acknowledges that 
the assistance Swint provided regarding the investigation of one 
individual turned was in fact "substantial." In the government's 
judgment, however, Swint failed to continue to provide substantial 
assistance sufficient to earn the section 5K1.1 motion when he 
committed the subsequent offenses because he violated the terms of the 
agreement and lost any credibility he might have as a future witness. In 
other words, his subsequent criminal acts undermined the usefulness of 
the assistance he had provided. See United States v. Wilkerson, 179 F.3d 
1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding district court's conclusion that 
government did not have to file a section 5K1.1 motion when the 
defendant had continued to use drugs after the agreement because that 
behavior undermined the "quality" of his assistance). We do not resolve 
this contention as it is not necessary for us to do so. 
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district court was too little and too late: too little because 
the government allegedly did not state everything Swint did 
in his cooperation, and too late because the government did 
not relay the details of Swint's cooperation to the district 
court until after the court had decided to depart upward 
based on Swint's criminal history. It is Swint's belief that 
the district court should have heard all the details of 
Swint's cooperation while it considered whether to depart 
upward based on his admitted "egregious" his criminal 
history, and that therefore Swint's substantial cooperation 
would have balanced out his criminal history and 
foreclosed the upward departure. 
 
We do not believe that the government was either too 
little or too late in its description of Swint's cooperation. 
First, Swint does not provide anything other than 
conclusory allegations to explain how the Government's 
description of his cooperation was, as he asserts, 
"understated and incomplete." Before the district court, the 
government offered a lengthy description of Swint's 
cooperation activities; this description takes up several 
pages of the hearing transcript, and would appear to satisfy 
any notion of a "full" and detailed chronology. Second, 
Swint does not explain why (or how) the government 
breached the agreement by offering its description at a time 
he characterizes as "unduly late" in the hearing. The most 
obvious weakness to Swint's argument is that there is no 
provision in the agreement dictating when the government 
must provide this information to the court; presumably it 
must only do so before the district court pronounces the 
sentence. 
 
Moreover, as the government points out, even if it had 
chronicled all the details of Swint's cooperative efforts 
before the district court decided to depart upward based on 
Swint's criminal history, these efforts have no relevance to 
a district court's decision whether to depart, upward or 
downward, based on criminal history. Section 4A1.3 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines discusses only departures based on 
the under or over-representation of criminal history scores; 
it nowhere suggests that a defendant's subsequent 
cooperation in any way wipes out his prior criminal record. 
This Court has observed that once a district court has 
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determined that a departure based on criminal history is 
warranted, it should then consider a defendant's 
cooperation with the government when sentencing within 
the new range. See United States v. Bruno, 897 F.2d 691, 
693 (3d Cir. 1990). The district court retains discretion, 
however, "as to whether to give effect to that cooperation." 
Bruno, 897 F.2d at 693. 
 
Bruno does not support Swint's contention that the 
district court was required to have considered his 
cooperation (and therefore had the full account of it from 
the government) before deciding to depart upward. Instead, 
it merely confirms that the district court acted within its 
discretion when, after determining that an upward 
departure was appropriate, it considered Swint's 
cooperation and sentenced him within the new range. That 
is what the district court did in this case. At sentencing, 
the district court stated that "I find that an upward 
departure of Mr. Swint's category is absolutely warranted" 
due to his thirty-year criminal history, and then began to 
determine what new level was appropriate. As it did so, the 
district court stated that "in considering what level in the 
Guidelines table adequately reflects the defendant's 
criminal history, I have considered the defendant's 
cooperation with the Government." Later, the government 
provided its lengthy narrative about Swint's cooperation to 
the district court and requested that the court sentence 
Swint to the lower half of the new range. The district court 
agreed and sentenced Swint to seventy months' 
imprisonment. The district court appropriately exercised its 
discretion in weighing Swint's cooperation in the context of 
the new sentencing range, and had the benefit of the 
government's description of Swint's cooperation to do so. In 
sum, we find that the government did not breach the plea 




Swint's sentence is 
AFFIRMED. 
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